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The conclusion at the beginning: the con-
tributors to the 11th issue of this journal agree
that communication is a main factor of success
in overcoming corporate crisis; however, it is
not a shield that can ward off all adversities.
Therefore, timely and transparent crisis com-
munications benefit from a dedicated team ef-
fort with clearly identified roles and responsi-
bilities.
In this journal, IR Firm approaches “crisis
communications” from different angles and
presents the views of various disciplines on the
topic. Besides the corporate perspective, the
investor, financial engineer, lawyer, communi-
cations specialist as well as the psychologist
expose their opinions. One other story draws
parallels to the political sphere. The rubric
Special Focus on the back side of the journal 
is dedicated to the actual subject “Volatility
and IR”.
One of the most critical issues, discussed in
several articles, is time. Many executives dis-
play excellent skill in generating shareholder
value as long as the business runs smoothly.
Yet, when exceptional events affect the com-
petitive environment or pressure from share-
holders is mounting, difficulties arise. It often
takes too long for management to come up
with a first reaction to a specific situation. Such
delays push every organisation into a defensive
position and signal uncertainty to the audi-
ence, which – for obvious reasons – is deroga-
tory to business confidence.
Another common ground is the importance
of regular contacts with all stakeholders. The
exchange of views reveals general concerns as
well as not yet noticed needs, allowing to solve
many conflicts before the fire is sparked. Con-
sequently, an effective IR programme supports
a company in overcoming crisis situations, but
also initiates and improves ongoing dialogue
with investors – a key task if the IR discipline
is to be defined in its verbatim interpretation.
Dr Michael Düringer, Partner,
The Investor Relations Firm AG
IS IT POSSIBLE TO PRE-
PARE FOR CORPORATE
CRISIS?
SPECIAL FOCUS: 
VOLATILITY AND 
INVESTOR RELATIONS
No such thing as a perfect world.
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Crisis communications
Imagine a company which always meets or exceeds expectations. All stakeholders
would be happy and there would be no need for a specific communications strat-
egy in case of bad news. There would be no such thing as bad news, let alone “cri-
sis”. In fact, the company would not even need a strategy for good news either… 
twofold: the company not only recovers
less harmed from the aftermath of a shock
wave but also benefits from the analysis of
the dangers and can draw consequences
for future actions.
stakeholder expectations – no matter how
diligent, efficient and innovative employ-
ees and management are*. Once a firm
has reached the sobering conclusion that
eternal delivery on expectations is not
possible, it is high time to design a strat-
egy about how to deal with bad news.
The benefits of a carefully planned
crisis communications strategy are
ack in reality we have to recog-
nise that hardly any firms live in
the perfect world just described.
I would even go further and claim that
sooner or later all companies fall short of
Communication
teams on probation
Baschi Dürr, Spokesman and Deputy
Head of the global Roche Group
Media Office, comments on how to
train managers.
Regula Stämpfli, Political Scientist
and Writer, clarifies what went
wrong in the “Swisscom case”.
Too many cooks spoil
the broth
Issues monitoring
Mark Eisenegger, Issues Monitoring
& Reputation Analyst at the
University of Zurich, talks about
how to assess rising issues.
953
I N V E S T O R
R E L AT I O N S
Special situations trigger volatility
Page 10
Bob Haville and Alison Allfrey, Financial
Dynamics, analyse how investor relations
can help reduce volatility, even in tor-
mented times.
Stefan Frischknecht, Fund Manager, Schroders
Please turn to page 2
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Appropriate crisis communication strategy strives for the protection of a company’s
image. It is an element of sound reputation management. 
Marisa Nöldeke-Wilde, Research Assistant 
and Doctoral Student at the Swiss Banking
Institute, University of Zurich
Reputation management – a precursor
of strategic crisis communication
n analytical framework on crisis
communication developed by
Coombs (Journal of Public
Relations Research, 1998) allows a sys-
tematic analysis of companies’ crises
response behaviour. 
Elements of crisis communication
(1) Attack (company confronts the
accuser and possibly threatens with
lawsuits); 
(2) Denial (company explains and
justifies the fact that no crisis exists); 
(3) Excuse (company minimises its
responsibility for the crisis by deny-
ing any intention to harm); 
(4) Justification (company argues
that there was no damage or injuries
and minimises the perceived dam-
age); 
(5) Ingratiation (company curries
favour with stakeholders for example
by reminding on its favourable past
actions or by providing products to
favourable prices); 
(6) Corrective action (company
repairs the damage and prevents a
repetition of the crisis); 
(7) Apology (company takes full
responsibility of the crisis and offers
compensation to victims). 
In practice these strategies are combined
and applied dynamically in response to
the development of the respective crisis.
The success of effective crisis communi-
cation relies on the company’s reputation. 
The Merck case
Consider the withdrawal of Vioxx by
Merck & Co., Inc. in 2004 as a response
to new evidence on higher heart attack
risk associated to its use. One can refer
to this situation as a “crisis”: it destroyed
about 27 % ($25 billion) of the compa-
ny’s market value within a single day –
this equals Richemont’s market capital-
isation. Merck’s strategy at the time of
withdrawal was to deny allegations
about earlier knowledge on health risks
related to the medicament (denial). It
justified the medicament’s sale so far
(justification) and pushed management’s
media presence with a comprehensive
campaign in order to demonstrate trans-
parency and work against potential ru-
mours (ingratiation). 
About a month later, the publication
of internal documents and e-mails un-
covered earlier knowledge of health risks
by the management. Merck denied their
authenticity and accused the media of
false reporting (denial and attack). The
company consistently pointed to its vol-
untary withdrawal in order to underline
its focus on patients’ health.
To date, Merck did never change its
communication strategy. Even though
patients’ faith in the company was
destroyed as internals became public, the
management was able to successfully re-
move the linkage between the company
and Vioxx, and thus restore its reputation. 
The Mercedes case
As a second application of the Coombs
framework consider Mercedes’ crisis
communication behaviour when its A-
Class failed the elk test in 1997. While at
the first stage of the crisis Mercedes’
management denied any safety prob-
lems and rather attacked the Swedish
test by blaming unrealistic test condi-
tions, it had to gradually change its com-
munication strategy thereafter. After
repeated test failures a combination of
A
denial, excuse, ingratiation, and correc-
tive action was chosen (Ihlen, Journal of
Public Relations Research, 2002). Safety
problems of the A-Class were still de-
nied; instead, the tires (not manufac-
tured by Mercedes) were blamed for the
failure. Ultimately, the tires were
changed and an electronic stability sys-
tem was added for free (corrective action
and ingratiation). 
It is questionable, whether a combin-
ation of denial and excuse is an appro-
priate strategy. Why would the manage-
ment excuse itself when in their opinion
there is no crisis? The crisis went forth
and media pressure became even
greater. Eventually, Mercedes aban-
doned the adopted strategy and apolo-
gised for the A-Class’s weakness in the
tests. A new version of the A-Class was
launched in 1998. 
Merck never reintroduced Vioxx and
restored its reputation through an exten-
sive image campaign, whereas Mercedes
apologised for the failures, took correc-
tive actions and relaunched a new version
of its product. Both companies applied
different communication strategies but
overcame the crisis thanks to strong past
reputation. 
Deep understanding and optimal re-
action to a crisis in the decisive moment
is of utmost importance. Yet reputation
management must be kept in mind as a
strategic long-term assignment. For
strong reputation works as a buffer which
can dampen crisis consequences.
Five basic rules are presented below
which characterise an investor’s expecta-
tions in terms of communications policy.
Crisis communications does not start
at the onset of a crisis, but before…
As an investor, I get suspicious when
management seems to think that it lives
in a risk-free world or if it refrains from
telling me where the dangers for my in-
vestment might come from. Knowing
where the risks are is paramount in in-
vestment management. Also, I am bewil-
dered by how many management teams
are reluctant to lay open their Achilles
heels. It cannot be for competitive rea-
sons, as I have learnt over the years that
competitors are always the best informed
when it comes to strength and weakness-
es of a player. It must be about ignorance
or arrogance, both of which are bad com-
panions for investing. 
Know when to call emergency and
what to tell them
In the SWX regulations there is the wide-
ly used expression of “significant impact
on operating results or asset values” that
should trigger a company to issue a press
release. Few companies are actually able
to define what they view as significant –
and again even fewer are ready to share
their views with investors. However, I
would be eager to know at what thresh-
old a company will issue a profit warning.
If during a prolonged stock price weak-
ness there was no news, I could reinforce
my position as a long-term investor and
buy more shares. And if something does
go wrong, I can be sure that the company
would not call an ambulance to catch a
thief…
Count the injured and display them
on a public board
When a shock wave hits a company,
shareholders have a right to know the
order of magnitude of the unlucky
event. I want to know if the victims are
to be counted by the dozens, the hun-
dreds, or the thousands. Sometimes, man-
agement states that it is too early to say
what the impact might be. Again, with
preparation, a strategy and a publicly
known threshold definition of a crisis, it
will be easier to gauge the severity of an
unforeseen event. What we can learn
from the crisis management in case of an
earthquake is how the public is con-
stantly informed about the number of
victims as well as the cases of happy sal-
vages.
When in trouble, know your way out
Once the bad news is out, management
should provide a rescue plan. Does the
event make it necessary to cut spending
or reconsider corporate strategy? If it is
just a temporary weakness in customer
demand, the company does not need to
sell the division, but I would expect to see
measures to prevent further losses or
profit erosion. Asset disposals are in my
view too often pursued as a rescue strat-
egy. It is all too tempting to get rid of a
problem by selling that part of a firm that
has caused it rather than to solve it. A
CFO was once even so blunt to tell me
that the ailing business they bought a
couple of years ago is no longer part of
their focus, but was then part of their ex-
pansion strategy. How can a management
team win long-term investors if they
follow short-term trends?
Don’t forget to talk about 
the lessons learnt
Too often management is so relieved to
emerge from a crisis that they want to get
back to “business as usual” as soon as pos-
sible. While I agree that the distraction
caused by a crisis should be put away
swiftly, I strongly believe that once the
shock is over, the involved parties must
get together for an analysis of the lessons
to be learnt. In a “Sarbanes-Oxley man-
ner”, management might think that the
right way to avoid future crisis is to over-
regulate and significantly increase the
audits. On the contrary, responsibility
should not be taken away from middle
management and put in the hands of a
rigid compliance system. One can learn
from mistakes; but it can only happen by
analysing why something has gone
wrong. If people are just given yet an-
other law book without any explanation
of why the rules have been established,
they might not be able to avoid mistakes
from happening twice.
To sum up, what investors expect
from a crisis communications policy is that
it follows a few principles that help deal-
ing with any corporate challenge: realism,
preparation, transparency and careful
business analysis.
* To explain why the various stakeholder demands cannot
always be met, take a company that wants to deliver to its
financial investors by means of growth, profits, or returns on
capital. It is easily disguised that due to the law of compound-
ing it is not possible for a firm to outgrow its peers for ever: 
the company would eventually marginalise all competitors, first
in its own industry, then in other sectors of the economy 
and finally be the economy itself, which is not sustainable.
Continued from page 1
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flect how to react if the own company
were concerned.
Every preparation has an end…
In any case, the attempt to plan any pos-
sible scenario in advance is doomed to
failure. On the one hand this would lead
to a bureaucracy of crisis protocols and
complex decision trees which would con-
tradict the imperative of fast action. On
the other hand, it can hardly ever be pre-
dicted how a certain event will be per-
ceived by the outside world. 
If a journalist struggles for news dur-
ing holidays, if an analyst misinterprets a
new figure on his spreadsheet, or if au-
thorities are especially sensitised due to
similar occurrences can make an event –
which under different circumstances
would not have attracted any interest – es-
calate to a real crisis. This chaos-theory-
like crisis development calls for clear de-
cision paths. For this reason, Roche prac-
tices an unlikely but not unthinkable
accident on its premises twice a year. Ex-
perts have to be pulled together, intervals
for information updates must be defined
in order to ensure that employees and
neighbours are informed quickly.
…and starts ways ahead of any crisis
It is eminently important to consider that
the iron rules of proactive communica-
tion also apply in the event of a crisis. 
Open and honest communication
while sticking to the defined terminolo-
gy, not engaging in speculations while
knowing the needs of journalists and in-
vestors, applies in good days as well as in
bad ones. Ultimately, crisis communica-
tion does not differ fundamentally from
any other kind of communication. Yet it
confirms, or rather uncovers, the true
quality of a communication team.
Communication
teams on probation
Crisis communication has much in common with stand-
ard communication best practices. As in many fields,
appropriate preparation combined with an attentive
monitoring of new, unexpected developments is half
the crisis’ successful management.
urrently, Roche is in very good
shape. In medical research, so-
cially and financially all indica-
tors are showing upwards. Roche has re-
cently marketed various drugs and diag-
nostic products which bring proven
benefits to patients with cancer, hepatitis
or transplantation. Moreover, in the first
half of 2006 the company managed to
create 200 new jobs in Switzerland while
clearly increasing turnover, profits and
margins on a corporate level. Now, lean-
ing back and assuming that this record will
avoid future crises would be erroneous in
two ways.
Avoid overconfidence …
Firstly, exposure to crisis grows in parallel
with success. Who is being attributed
above-average potential by stock markets
or by benevolent media, is under constant
observation. Good news is no more a sur-
prise while negative occurrences can
quickly escalate to a crisis. Secondly, the
C
Baschi Dürr, Spokesman and Deputy Head of the
global Roche Group Media Office, Basel
momentum of success bears the risk of
making an organisation indolent. Atten-
tion dwindles and the company runs the
risk of being overwhelmed by a minor
drawback because it is not prepared.
…and stay alert
Good preparation is half the communica-
tion strategy when it comes to dealing
with potential issues and crisis. Mostly,
business performance is steered by the
company itself, thus defining a schedule
harmonised with the ad hoc publicity
guidelines. Yet – e.g. in context of the
safety discussions around an influenza
drug, a management failure or a militant
pet protection organisation – timing is
often imposed from the outside.
No company is immune from being
confronted with such challenges. The job
of communication specialists is to pre-
pare specifically where something is in
the doing.
In case of a pending litigation, investor
and media releases for positive and nega-
tive scenarios can be drafted. If a com-
petitor is subject of criticism which con-
cerns the entire industry, one has to re-
Please turn to page 4
Preventing a crisis
Day in day out, a quick glance at the front pages of a newspaper will reveal an organ-
isation in crisis: the airline with the security scare, the hotel chain with the food bug,
the financial institution with a compliance problem, or the insurer moving offshore. 
Any communications director reading these stories must think “Thank goodness
that is not us”.  But sometimes we do have to face a crisis, and the reputation of our
organisation lies in our hands.  So how do we protect ourselves and communicate
effectively during a crisis?
Jonathan Hawker, Managing Director, 
Financial Dynamics, London
here are several textbooks on
crisis management that advocate
an academic approach to effec-
tive crisis management. They recommend
a dialogue with anyone attacking your or-
ganisation, that you map your stakehold-
ers and that you communicate often and
comprehensively. In my view, this is folly.
How can you have a dialogue with an ani-
mal rights activist group that is threaten-
ing to blow up your Finance Director and
which believes your business is morally
wrong? Why would you want to commu-
nicate frequently and comprehensively
with a politician who is opposed to your
decision to close a factory? The answer to
both of these questions is simple: there is
no benefit to your business in attempting
to engage with individuals and organisa-
tions who are determined to attack you.
Dialogue does not deter attackers who
have entrenched views.
So what is the alternative? This is what
I call pragmatic crisis communications. At
its heart is a simple understanding that at-
tacks on your organisation only have a
negative impact if they are repeated or be-
lieved. Whilst we cannot silence attackers,
we can persuade the media not to report
these attacks. We can present a compelling
counter argument. We can communicate
directly with stakeholders to neutralise
their concerns about the attackers’ claims.
These are strategies based on what I call
the V5 Impact Formula.
There are two types of crisis: sudden
crises, such as a natural disaster or terror-
ist attack; and emerging crises, where the
problem or issue degenerates to a point
whereby its handling threatens the repu-
tation of an organisation. Most crises on
the front page fall within this category.
In such emerging crises, it is not so
much the catalyst which causes the crisis,
for example the employee who colludes
in a fraud. Instead it is the company’s hand-
ling of this problem which can create a
crisis of reputation.
So if we use this example to illustrate
the Formula, what happens after the
company discovers the fraud is a void
(V1). There is uncertainty about what to
communicate or how to communicate
the event. The issue is picked up by the
media or another stakeholder, the vindi-
cator (V2). The vindicator presents the fi-
nancial company as the villain (V3) be-
cause it has failed to uphold a value (V4)
that the general public hold dear – in this
case the values of honesty and trustworthi-
ness (is this organisation to be trusted
T
with our money?) – and so the customers
of the financial institution not only are
presented as victims (V5) but come to
consider themselves as victims. When
these five Vs come together, there is an in-
evitable Impact. And in this case the Im-
pact is that there is a public loss of confi-
dence in the institution. Whether it wants
to or not, it will be obliged to communi-
cate at some stage.
Pragmatic crisis management would
advise that the organisation does not al-
low the situation to deteriorate to this
point. Our advice in this situation is to
communicate quickly: you would need to
take what journalists call the Gotcha out
of the story by admitting quickly that a
fraud has been uncovered, that it is an
isolated incident, that you are onto it and
have put systems in place to ensure no re-
currence. Sounds simple. However, most
companies are reluctant to take swift and
decisive action.
So how do you avoid becoming the
villain of the piece should you enter a po-
tential crisis? To manage any crisis or po-
tential crisis effectively you need a tried
and tested operational response and good
communications. Often, however, com-
munications are the poor cousin. To en-
sure your team operates effectively, focus
first on enhancing your communications
process.
There are two schools of thought on
how to prepare for crises. Traditionalists
argue you need detailed plans covering all
eventualities within a manual. Transport
for London recently told a crisis confer-
ence they took this risk register approach
when launching the congestion charge.
They worked out all the potential crises
they could face and decided in advance
how to respond. Then they had a full-scale
dress rehearsal involving real journalists
and role players to test their communica-
tions. They say they made mistakes in that
drill and learned from the experience. It
worked. On launch day communications
were smooth and polished. And the
scheme also worked perfectly. 
Of course not everyone has the bene-
fit of knowing when the media plan to
create a crisis for you on a given day, and
sadly the natural world gives little warn-
ing of impending disaster. This is where
the second approach to crisis communi-
cations, again what I call pragmatic crisis
communications, has the edge over the
traditionalists.
Firstly, no matter how comprehensive
your manual, it will never be able to deal
with all circumstances and all eventualities.
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Continued from page 3
ut what is a crisis? In short: a cri-
sis is a situation which represents
a crucial stage or turning point
and requires conflict resolution. The dif-
ference with an emergency, which is a
sudden unforeseen incidence, lies in the
time available to react and resolve the
conflict. Accidents, on the other hand, can
easily lead to a crisis even though there is
no direct causal effect.
Scanning through the latest cases
shows that corporate crisis can be divided
in two main categories: specific issue-re-
lated to or resulting from miscommuni-
cation. The following article provides the
readers with examples of recent interna-
tional and Swiss cases. As the details of
these cases are often not well known, this
shall provide the necessary details.
In the past ten years the number of scandals covered by the media has significantly
risen. Although they have various origins, all crises have one thing in common: the
need for specific crisis communication.
B
Andrea A. Ullmann, Consultant, 
The Investor Relations Firm AG 
Scandals, emergencies and
accidents…
In my view too detailed a plan can often
be a millstone rather than an aid. For one
public sector client, we replaced a 568-
page crisis communications plan with a
six-step plan their team could store, with
key phone numbers, on their mobile
phone. The plan is basic, but it is tried and
tested under difficult circumstances. The
steps are: assemble the right team; assess
the facts; review your audiences and their
potential reactions; develop your com-
munications strategy and message; assign
responsibilities for implementation and
get on with it, then review information
reported back and start the process again.
Crises do not permit democratic de-
bate. Decisions must be made swiftly, so a
strong and trusted leader is essential. His or
her role will be to ensure the right strategic
decisions are made. An operations chief
and communications leader should ensure
these decisions are implemented and re-
port back any difficulties. Remember, use
your resources well – separate strategy and
direction from implementation.
The second step is often overlooked
in a detailed plan. Get someone to the
scene and get the facts first-hand. If your
problem is not a natural disaster, test the
facts thoroughly before reacting to another
party’s attacks or claims.
Pragmatic communications focus on
delivering a simple message to each audi-
ence, and listening carefully to its re-
sponse. Once you have the facts ask your-
self who needs to know and who will re-
act to this, criticising me or causing me
pain. Prioritise your audiences. If you
need to reach the broader public, call the
media. Remember, don’t waste time call-
ing a press conference. The media prefer
their own interviews anyway, and this is
quicker. In crisis drills, private sector com-
panies often forget to keep their own staff
informed of developments. Make sure
your communications leader tasks some-
one to ensure each audience is spoken
and listened to.
Too often in crises people forget the
basic rule of all communications: keep it
simple. Getting the message right is, for
many organisations, a time-consuming
and political job. Under crisis pressures it
is important to remember that you need
to get accurate information across fast.
Keep it factual. Keep it in everyday lan-
guage. Keep it very short.
I agree with traditionalists that crisis
teams that are regularly tested function
most effectively. You don’t need to go as
far as the congestion charging team’s full
day with actors. Twice yearly tabletop ex-
ercises can achieve similarly successful re-
sults. It is best to allow a knowledgeable
outsider to develop a true test for your
team. This independence enables all key
players to participate and avoids you re-
ceiving a backlash from your team for giv-
ing them too hard a time. 
Finally, if you find yourself in the line
of fire, never believe that a “head in the
sand” approach is in your best business in-
terests. Hoping it will all blow over is a
classic boardroom strategy to deal with a
media feeding frenzy. Unfortunately, this
just creates a void for the media and at-
tackers to fill. So you will end up simply
ensuring that you experience a crisis.
SPECIFIC ISSUE-
RELATED CRISES 
COMMUNICATION
CRISES
Enron and Worldcom – accounting
irregularities
In 2001, the United States witnessed two
of the largest accounting scandals ever:
Enron and Worldcom. Enron, once one
of the world’s leading electricity, natural
gas, pulp, paper, and communications
companies, hid many of its debts and
losses in a complicated and opaque off-
shore structure which was not reported in
the financial statements. Worldcom, the
telecommunications company, on the
other hand, underreported its “line costs”
by capitalising them on the balance sheet
rather than expensing them. Further-
more, revenues were inflated with bogus
accounting entries from “corporate unal-
located revenue accounts”. Both compa-
nies were able to create the illusion of
sound financials while they were actually
loosing money.
On top of this, as the stock started
falling, the CEO of Worldcom, Bernard
Ebbers, who accumulated most of his
wealth through company stock, came
under pressure from banks. Consequently,
he asked for a loan from his company. Al-
though he succeeded at first, his strategy
ultimately failed and he was ousted in
2002.
In 2002, the Enron and Worldcom cases
led to the creation of a famous and far-
reaching US federal securities law, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The law dictates
stronger penalties for fraud and requires
public companies to avoid giving loans to
management, to report more information
Adecco – lack of communication
In early 2004, the world leader in human
resource solutions, Adecco, had to post-
pone the release of its 2003 financial fig-
ures twice due to accounting problems in
the United States. The company’s spare
communication in this matter provoked a
dramatic share price drop. Despite the
fact that eventually no significant irregu-
larities were found and that good results
could finally be presented for that year,
the share price did not fully recover.
The Adecco case perfectly demonstrates
how a lack of adequate communication
to the public, to maintain stronger inde-
pendence from auditors and to report on
internal financial control procedures.
Many other countries followed with simi-
lar changes in corporate governance
legislations.
Unaxis – takeover fight
In spring 2005, Mirko Kovats and Ronny
Pecik, owners of the Victory investment
company, fought a tough battle against
parts of the shareholder basis including
the former majority owner – the Anda-
Bührle Family Holding (Ihag) – to ac-
quire the technology company Unaxis.
Until the regular general shareholder
meeting in April 2005, Victory was able
to acquire 34 % of Unaxis’ shares which
made the investment company the largest
shareholder. However, as Victory was
only able to account for 16 % by the close
of registration, the investment company
was unable to fully deploy its weight at
the meeting. Unhappy with the decisions
taken and determined to influence Unax-
is’ development, Victory requested an ex-
traordinary shareholder meeting to use its
34 % voting power in order to reverse
some of the decisions taken.
After extensive negotiations, Ihag de-
cided to sell its shares to the investment
company, thus allowing Victory to con-
trol over 50 % in Unaxis. Consequently,
the extraordinary shareholder meeting
that took place in June 2005 allowed Vic-
tory to win the fight and reverse the de-
cisions taken in April.
The Unaxis case shows that unfriendly
takeover attempts rarely come out of the
blue and often hit companies in oper-
ational or financial difficulties. Against a
board of directors and management team
with weakened credibility, tough investors
have a walkover, also in terms of commu-
nication. 
driven by legal concerns rather than com-
munication sense, can cause a sharp de-
cline in share price, from which a compa-
ny may take a very long time to recuperate
– even if the operational business is doing
well. 
Swissfirst – share trading before
M&A announcement
In September 2005, the financial service
provider Swissfirst (investment banking,
private banking, asset management) and
Bellevue Holding (investment banking)
announced their merger. This deal would
not have received as much public atten-
tion if shortly after the merger insider
trading suspicion had not arisen. Indeed,
share movement around that time
showed an exceptionally high quantity of
traded shares and a significant price in-
crease. Some market participants believe
that Swissfirst asked its shareholders to
sell their shares. After the announcement
of the merger, shareholders who had
kept Swissfirst holdings, saw their share
value double.
In August 2006, the case was om-
nipresent in the media as details and es-
pecially contradictions in Swissfirst’s de-
fence were uncovered. At the time this
journal went to press, the main questions
about who knew how much about the
deal and when, was still with the Federal
Banking Commission and the attorneys.
The Swissfirst case shows the importance
of a stringent and concise communication
policy in a situation in which a company
and its representatives are under high pres-
sure.
Schindler – cultural 
misunderstanding
In June 2006, a young man died in an ac-
cident in Japan in which a Schindler ele-
vator was involved. The top management
of the elevator and escalator company,
however, did not react or comment the
tragedy. Betting on the likelihood that
Schindler was not at fault, the manage-
ment team thought an apology would
equal a guilty plea in public opinion and
therefore made no comment.
Yet Japanese public opinion expected
a fast reaction including a public apology.
As no apologies were made until four
days after the event, the Japanese people
were shocked and angry at the company’s
ignorance and disrespect for conventions.
This mismatch of cultural business be-
haviour led to a massive loss of company
credibility in the Japanese market.
The Schindler case shows once again how
important it is for a company to be aware
of local business conventions and cultural
context in the markets it operates in.
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Merz clearly showed how controversial
the Swisscom decision was within gov-
ernment itself. Thus, he lost control over
the issue. From then on, the communica-
tions agenda was dictated by the oppon-
ents of the deal and the government got
the position of the helpless observer in-
stead of the active communicator. 
To make matters worse, Merz first
hinted that Swisscom was to abstain from
any acquisition outside Switzerland.
This was reaffirmed by Justice Min-
ister Christoph Blocher and then
later disputed by Communication
Minister Moritz Leuenberger.
This unleashed havoc in
the media and – much
worse – in the stock
market. The dam-
age done, the Fed-
eral Councillors
continued to
communicate in
the media rather
with each other
with the result
Too many cooks spoil the broth
The stock market downturn was spectacular. Within a day, the Swiss Federal Coun-
cil annihilated roughly 1.5 billion of tax payer’s money through poor communica-
tions. Moreover, in summer 2006, Parliament buried the liberalisation of Swisscom.
The Swisscom case and the corresponding communications of the Federal Coun-
cil are object lessons in how not to do it.
Dr Regula Stämpfli, Political Scientist and Writer,
Bern and Brussels
ell-planned risk communi-
cations is the backbone of
any government called
upon to demonstrate crisis management.
Whether in event of natural disasters, ac-
cidents or acts of terror, there is only one
communication goal that counts for the
responsible politician: tell the bad news in
a way that makes it less abominable and
gives some comfort and hope. In this re-
spect, the Federal Council proved in the
Swiss annus horribilis 2001 (9/11, Swiss-
air, Zug) that it can display statesmanlike
leadership and not only for the sake of
political tactics but for the common good.
The picture is less bright when it
comes to assessing their crisis communi-
cations in political matters, i.e. in home-
made crisis. Here the Swiss government
is apt to act inconsistently, display insecu-
rity and deliver itself – in communicative
terms – into the hands of its political foes.
This could be observed with the liberal-
isation of the electricity market, with re-
form tax and with certain AHV or health
insurance reforms. But the Federal
Council’s performance in the case of
Swisscom liberalisation topped all
previous communication lapses –
especially the fact that market-sensitive
information concerning a prosperous
company was communicated in a way
that led to a spectacular collapse in share
price, all due to political incompetence. 
The first blunder lay in the ostensible
announcement by Finance Minister
Merz on Thursday, 24 November 2005.
Federal Councillor Merz communicated
the liberalisation of Swisscom with little
conviction. Surprisingly, he wasn’t pre-
pared to answer obvious questions
such as: Why now? What are the
consequences? What happens to
public guarantees concern-
ing communication ac-
cess? These ques-
tions were fore-
seeable. They
should have
been answered
clearly. But this
did not happen.
On the con-
trary, Federal
Councillor
that the government’s position seemed
more unsure than ever.
Chaos was perfect. The Swisscom-
Eircom deal fell through. The Swisscom
shares took a nosedive. And the liberal-
isation agenda had to be buried. After this
debacle, the Swiss Confederation re-
mains, at one and the same time, Swiss-
com’s lawmaker, regulator, largest cus-
tomer and shareholder.
What lessons can be drawn?
Firstly, market-sensitive political deci-
sions must be prepared meticulously.
Corporations already know this; govern-
ments have yet to learn it. 
Secondly, controversial political busi-
ness which may have an impact on mar-
kets must be communicated in a clear and
concise manner. Moreover, the commu-
nication effort must be focused on a sin-
gle subject. And, as the majority share-
holder of a listed company, it is unaccept-
able to prescribe the business strategy via
television. This harms the company, it
harms the government and it harms mar-
kets as well as the citizen’s confidence.
Thirdly, it must be self-evident that if
a government decides to move towards
liberalisation, all facts, figures, and conse-
quences must be at hand. But the real art
of communications is not only to say the
right thing, in the right place, at the right
time, but also to avoid saying the wrong
thing at the wrong moment. This applies
especially to the Swisscom case, where
the announcement prohibiting overseas
expansion wrecked the privatisation. And
last but not least, equally important for
government communications: too many
cooks spoil the broth. 
W
Trust is engendered through persuasive arguments that are credible, transparent and consistent.
I N V E S T O R  R E L A T I O N S 11th issue, September 20066
Corporate crises have various reasons. Most cases of existence-threatening situa-
tions have one thing in common: problems do not hit a company unexpectedly, 
but are usually the result of a long-lasting downward trend. 
Dr Martin Hofacker and Dr Thomas Vettiger,
Managing Partners IFBC, Zurich
ne factor explaining crises is the
combination of increased mar-
ket dynamics and growing
complexity. This made market forecasts
much more challenging in the past couple
of years and led to increased business risk
for companies. A company would be ill-
advised, however, if it were satisfied to
use these developments to solely explain
an unsatisfactory business development.
Rather, these developments should push
management to readjust its information
tools to fit with the new set-up. More than
ever these tools must provide manage-
ment with relevant information relating
to company development, in a timely
manner and with reliable quality. On an
aggregated level, the company’s progres-
sion can best be analysed based on its fi-
nancial performance. It is therefore ne-
cessary to check the suitability of man-
agement tools used to provide financial
transparency in a dynamic environment.
Transparency to cash and value
creation are key
It is obvious that even in simple and clear-
ly laid out circumstances a financial man-
agement system consisting of only an an-
nual balance sheet and income statement
is no longer sufficient. For risk-adequate
financial business steering this account-
ing-centred view must be broadened
with prospective information about cash-
flow generation as well as financial infor-
mation regarding value creation. Since in-
solvency causes serious problems in the
shortrun, the liquidity forecast is of high
importance. In order to serve as an early-
warning tool, a liquidity plan designed as
a monthly rolling cash-flow statement
with a twelve-month time horizon is
deemed appropriate. However, the prac-
tical implementation can be challenging,
since the planning set-up of many com-
panies does not yet use a rolling forecast
approach for the overall planning process.
This calls for coordination and reconcili-
ation efforts in order to guarantee consist-
ent financial planning data.
Unlike liquidity-related information
allowing to control solvency, financial in-
formation regarding value creation shows
if planned earnings cover the claims of
both debt and equity holders for a risk-
adequate compensation of their invest-
ments. If the company is not able to meet
investors’ expectations, the consequences
may be serious: potential reactions in-
clude a drop in company value, and, in
the medium term, a downgrade of a com-
pany’s credit rating or standing. The com-
pany will face difficulties in raising debt
and equity, combined with increasing
O
costs for new capital. In order to meet to-
morrow’s investor expectations manage-
ment needs to assess the value impact of
today’s decision on future performance.
To do so, they need to evaluate decisions
using analytical tools such as discounted
cash flow models or economic profit cal-
culations. The primary challenge is not
the choice of an adequate tool. It is much
more its accurate application. The reliable
disclosure of the value contribution of an
investment requires a correct handling of
these projections in the financial model,
taking account of currencies, inflation and
project-specific risk parameters. Many
companies still rely on financial tools
which do not capture and disclose cor-
rectly the risk profile of a project or of the
company as whole.
Empower the financial mindset in
your company
An information system based on the
principles outlined above detects critical
Early warnings through financial
transparency
The legal framework in
crisis situations
situations at an early stage through their
financial implications. This permits the
analysis of their operational causes and
allows taking action in a timely manner.
Yet the availability of financial manage-
ment information in itself is not suffi-
cient for the risk-adequate handling of
corporate uncertainty. The existence of a
financial mindset in a company is of
equal importance. This financial mind-
set must not be anchored solely with the
CFO. All decisiontakers on corporate
level need to have the ability to assess the
impact of operational decisions on fi-
nancial key figures. This supports the
culture of a firm-wide risk management
approach.
Knowledge about communication liabilities is of foremost importance for the
executive management of a listed company. Crisis situations, in particular, require
communication efforts in line with applicable legal restrictions regarding timing,
recipients, and means.
Dr Adrian Dörig, LL.M., 
VISCHER Attorneys at Law, Zurich
ommunications consistent with
the regulatory framework is de-
cisive for preserving legitimate
corporate interests in the best possible
manner. Otherwise, especially if the ad
hoc publicity guidelines are violated, the
potential for damage is substantial. 
Organisational precautions
Prior to any crisis situation, a listed com-
pany must take precautionary measures
in order to act and react appropriately in
case of emergency. Such measures com-
prise:
• The quick notification of the respons-
ible corporate bodies is put into place.
• Clear powers and duties are attributed,
in particular for the issuance of ad hoc
notices. 
• The responsible corporate bodies must
be informed about procedures and legal
restrictions.
Measures to prevent information
leaks and insider crime
Information leaks and insider crime can
greatly harm listed companies and their
shareholders as well as damage the com-
pany’s image and investor confidence. In
crisis situations – which typically involve
a significant amount of confidential in-
formation being in circulation – counter
measures are of particular importance; for
example:
• Collect “insider declarations with trad-
ing restrictions” from employees who
possess relevant information.
• Agree upon contractual penalties for the
employees concerned.
• Conduct internal “insider lists”.
Ad hoc publicity guidelines
For listed companies, the ad hoc public-
ity guidelines are of most relevance. The
obligation for disclosure of potentially
price-sensitive facts is stated in art. 72 of
the Listing Rules of SWX and outlined in
the Directive on Ad hoc Publicity.
The Listing Rules commit listed com-
panies to providing the public with true,
clear, and complete information as soon
as potentially price-sensitive facts occur.
Since potentially price-sensitive facts are
sufficient, it does not imply that this in-
formation will indeed influence the price
of the securities in question.
As regards the price sensitivity of facts
subjected to the ad hoc publicity guide-
lines, there is a simple rule of thumb: if an
insider were to view a certain corporate
event as not being reflected adequately by
the security price and would thus be
prompted to perform a transaction – then
this event would be subject to the ad hoc
publicity guidelines. For instance, profit
warnings; an unexpected resignation of a
board member, executive manager or au-
ditor; recently discovered liabilities (e.g.
product or environmental risks); or prior
false information of the media are typical
cases for potentially price-sensitive facts.
Important to know, furthermore, is
that forecasts expressed orally – for ex-
ample, in the media – may also be con-
sidered as price-sensitive facts. Thus, the
SWX Disciplinary Commission issued a
warning to an issuer because its CEO re-
vised prior earnings forecasts in a media
interview, which led to a 3 % share price
drop on the day of publication. Correct
behaviour would have been to comply
with the ad hoc publicity guidelines by
officially informing the SWX and the
media with a press release. In another de-
cision, the Disciplinary Commission
ADDITIONAL COMPUL-
SORY COMMUNICATION
The Stock Exchange and Securities Trad-
ing Act as well as the Code of Obligations
impose, inter alia, the following:
• In case of a public takeover offer, the tar-
geted company’s board of directors is re-
quired to deliver a public statement.
• Certain changes in the level of partici-
pations held in securities of a listed com-
pany must be notified, and the Federal
Banking Commission must be notified if
the issuer has reason to believe that a
shareholder is in breach of its correspond-
ing obligation to notify.
• If a company foresees mass dismissals,
information and consultation of employ-
ees or their representatives as well as the
authorities is compulsory.
• The board of directors is required to no-
tify the judge in case of the company’s
over-indebtedness.
C
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Interacting with people
under high pressure
High workloads, in terms of quality and quantity, demand a capability for adapta-
tion, which in turn requires adequate coping resources. However, these resources
are restricted, and a disequilibrium between demands and resources is known to
cause stress. To be exact, it is one of the definitions of stress.
Dr Dirk Hanebuth and 
Prof Dr Manfred Schedlowski, 
Institute of Behavioural Sciences, ETH Zurich
hat are the consequences in
the context of communica-
tion? Individuals under
pressure experience a reduced “stock of
energy” for other processes and actions.
Communication behaviour reflects this
“reallocation of energy”. For example, the
symptoms of vital exhaustion and burn-
out also include changes in social and
communicational behaviours: irritation,
reduced enthusiasm and interest, social
withdrawal, and lack of concentration are
potential indicators of beginning or on-
going exhaustion. Physical reactions, such
as a reduction in the quantity and quality
of sleep or psychosomatic complaints,
very often accompany these psychologic-
al reactions and additionally affect the
capacity of coping resources. As most re-
cent neuropsychological research has
demonstrated, these changes in social and
communication skills in stressed individ-
uals are caused by the enhanced release of
so-called stress hormones. 
React appropriately
The coincidence of high demands, re-
duced resources and communication
deficits is typical. The stressed individual’s
communication is therefore very often
less empathic, less interested, and more
impatient. Communication partners who
are confronted with these signs should
not show reactance but behave in an em-
pathic way. People who are able to inter-
pret these signs in a differential manner
are more likely to react appropriately.
They are able to see the message content
and the “mood background” of the inter-
action partner simultaneously. That
means, the communication partner with
sufficient resources compensates for the
other person’s lack of it.
W
sanctioned an issuer because its quarterly
earnings were accidentally disclosed in
the Sunday press; the company did not
publish the official figures immediately
but waited until Monday evening. Fur-
thermore, the Disciplinary Commission
ascertained that the company acted negli-
gently and that it should have been pre-
pared for information leaks. In yet another
decision, the Disciplinary Commission
detected a breach regarding equal treat-
ment of market participants: an issuer 
had informed the participants of the an-
nual results conference half an hour be-
fore the other interested parties were in-
formed.
To guarantee rapid information of the
media, an internal policy regarding ad hoc
publicity is as necessary as clearly attrib-
uted decision powers and duties (author-
isation of ad hoc notice). Only in excep-
tional cases (when, for example, the issuer
has yet to decide internally whether an-
other company will be acquired and the
due diligence phase is ongoing), is a post-
ponement of price-sensitive facts’ disclo-
sure possible. The issuer, however, must
guarantee complete confidentiality of the
relevant facts. If a leak occurs, the fact
must be disclosed immediately. If it hap-
pens during trading hours, SWX must be
notified immediately by phone. Please turn to page 8
In times of stress, managers undergo a change in their social and communicational behaviours.
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A quick call for action
As different as crisis situations in corporate life may be, there is one thing they
have in common: emergencies call for quick action in communications. An
appropriate communication tool set is not a striking shield preventing from any
adversities. But, it effectively supports any organisation to overcome potential cri-
sis situations.
Martin Meier-Pfister, Partner, 
The Investor Relations Firm AG
ossible extracts from real life ex-
perience: a company’s secretary
general calls at midnight telling
that four of the firm’s top managers
most probably died. The small airplane
of one of the top managers crashed
close to Vienna. According to first re-
ports of local police nobody survived.
“What are the priorities in terms of
communications?”
The CEO of a stock market high-
flyer calls between Christmas and New
Year saying that he was informed by
the head of audit about accounting ir-
regularities. The word “fraud” is in the
air. “We need help in contingency plan-
ning.”
A journalist of a big daily newspaper
calls asking for information about a dis-
gruntled client of a prestigious private
bank: He has detailed information about
the bank’s transactions and investment
guidelines. “Can you please respond to
my ten detailed questions within the
next 24 hours?”
The first of the examples above – an
unlikely accident – hits management and
communications out of the blue. It was
handled as well as it could be and did not
have any impact on image or operations
of the company. The outcome was dif-
ferent in the second case, the financial
scandal. Communications played an im-
portant role in the efforts to save the
company but did eventually not prevent
it from going bankrupt. The third ex-
ample refers to a foreseeable incident
where media response and procedures
could be prepared. 
In any case of corporate crisis, an im-
proper initial reaction may substantially
increase problems and worsen the situa-
tion. “There is no second chance to make
a first impression” is true in this context,
as it is in everyday life.
Key questions
Although every emergency and crisis
situation is different, some questions al-
ways remain the same: What do we have
to know before we decide and say any-
thing? Should we embrace the crisis and
inform in depth, or should we go for a
low profile? Is the crisis severe enough
for an active statement or should the is-
sue be treated as a minor event, calling
for reactive, verbal statements? Who has
to be informed first? What can we say,
what are the key messages? Who is the
company’s spokesperson? Is public ap-
pearance of top management required?
How is the information to be distrib-
uted? How do we organise ourselves?
What are the likely developments and
scenarios which could result in specific
strategies or wordings?
Standard advice for any company,
even in uneventful times, is to ensure
that a company’s decision makers can in-
teract whenever required, also at night-
times, on weekends, during vacations. A
practical tool in order to get the above
questions answered quickly is a phone
line enabling conference calls at any giv-
en time. Another minimal precaution for
crisis issues is an emergency contact list
of top management, or an around-the-
clock hotline served by a communica-
tions team member. Also, employees or
third-party providers ensuring “informa-
tion logistics”, i.e. web master or press
release dispatcher, must be available at all
times.
Mind training
It is advisable to have more than that.
Many crisis situations are foreseeable.
With a little bit of imagination, critical
events that are likely to happen and car-
ry significant reputation risks can be
identified. The questions above can be
answered in advance. The mind is
trained should anything happen.
Also, many challenging situations
evolve over time, with signs on the hori-
zon long before an issue hits a specific
company and provokes a phone call by a
clever financial analyst or an investigative
journalist. Issues monitoring helps to
classify respective thoughts (see article of
Mark Eisenegger, page 9). Since financial
markets and the media have a tendency
to inflate a number of single issues to a
crisis, it is in every company’s interest to
keep public problems as small as pos-
sible. Knowing the facts of the respective
issues as well as having answers to nasty
questions ready has proved to be the best
precaution.
However, the best issue management
and contingency planning cannot pre-
vent undesired events. In crisis situations,
one has to recognise that the information
needs of the respective target groups – i.e.
analysts, investors, bondholders, journal-
ists, clients, employees – are accentuated.
Content, measures and frequency of
contact have to be adapted to their spe-
cific requirements, ensuring the consist-
ency of key messages. Other standard
advice in crisis situations includes the
one-voice policy and the definition of
topics that may eventually lead the way
out of the crisis. These facts in mind,
every crisis must be tackled with indis-
pensable common sense, bearing the
famous saying from the Swiss military in
mind: Don’t panic under fire.
P
Give a break
At the front line of business, the interest
of a potential contract partner can rise and
fall with good or bad communication, not
only in financial business. When com-
munication problems arise, it is necessary
to search for the reasons in order to focus
the intervention. However, training
someone in communication techniques,
whose high potential is exhausted, is sim-
ply alleviating symptoms, not solving the
problem. 
Funnily enough, coaches in the world
of sport would hardly be criticised for
giving an injured top player a break or
special training. Why not follow the same
strategy with exhausted top corporate
players? Employees who are at the front
line and are involved in continuous com-
munication processes may experience
stress caused by the communication itself.
Current methods for capturing burn-out,
in fact, differ according to whether the
causes are general, work related, or client
related.
Identify exhaustion at an early stage
There are reliable methods to identify ex-
hausted employees in the early stages of
an exhaustion process, that is, before
communication is influenced negatively.
Companies can use screening instru-
ments to evaluate the relation between
resources and demands for their employ-
ees. Users get an individual, anonymous
feedback which acts as a useful starting
point for the coaching process; the board
of directors receives an elaborate sum-
mary providing information which is
valuable for personnel and organisational
development. Thus, communication
processes – often enough essential for
successful management – can be opti-
mised and adapted to the individual re-
sources, to job-related demands and
stress. Isn’t this good news?
A free on-line test of the relation
between demands and resources in
your case can be ordered by
dirk.hanebuth@ifv.gess.ethz.ch.
Continued from page 7
4 SIMPLE RULES TO IMPROVE YOUR 
INFORMATION EFFICIENCY
Identify your key targets
A systematic analysis of existing and potential investor contacts
is crucial for well-directed and structured campaigns addressing
shareholders and investors. Special databases offer access to the
profiles of major investors and analysts. This data is particularly
useful when preparing individual meetings and arranging road
show presentations.
Professionalise the compliance management
Both, from a legal as well as an IR-relevant perspective,
accounting policies and practices, risk management activities,
value reporting and corporate governance are subject to increasing
regulation. At the same time, an inadequate communications
policy coupled with the disregard of disclosure requirements has
led to a huge loss of trust and destruction of value. 
Analyse your communication efforts
Perception studies take the pulse of investors, analysts and jour-
nalists and can gather their suggestions for improving a compa-
ny’s communications policy. They provide insights on how well
these groups understand a company’s value drivers, strategy and
targets and how they view the related transparency and quality
of information.
Webcasting & Telephone Conferencing for everyone
Today’s telephone conferences are often only available to invited
analysts and investors. To bring the live audiostream to the web
site is cost-efficient and opens the way to ensuring equal treat-
ment of shareholders by making all information available to
everyone. Using MMS and UMTS – which enables fast data
transmission to mobile devices – can even bring the moving pic-
ture to an investor’s mobile phone. 
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Dr Mark Eisenegger, Issues Monitoring 
& Reputation Analysis, Forschungsbereich
Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft ( fög), 
University of Zurich
Issues monitoring: 
understanding corporate
crises in good time
In today’s media society, the risks of a painful loss of reputation have grown in
leaps and bounds. There is correspondingly great demand for tools such as Is-
sues Monitoring designed for the early detection of risks in the public environ-
ment of organisations. At Zurich University’s Research Institute for the Public
Sphere and Society (fög), such Issues Monitoring tools have been developed, in
close cooperation with companies and administrative bodies, and have been suc-
cessfully implemented in practice. 
Early detection – but of what?
Experience from our research teaches us
that the aim of such early-warning sys-
tems cannot be to surprise companies
continuously with completely new and
unknown issues. The health-damaging
effects of asbestos, the distribution of baby
milk powder in the Third World, the
nameless bank accounts of Holocaust vic-
tims, the question of reasonable salaries
for top managers as well as the former re-
lationships of Swiss business to the South
African apartheid state – these are ex-
amples of issues that have been known for
many years and have been underestimat-
ed for an equally long period, ultimately
with far-reaching consequences by the
companies concerned. The main business
of Issues Monitoring is not to reveal new
issues as such, but to correctly assess the
significance of the well-known ones.
Many monitoring systems suffer the ser-
ious deficit of adding to the information
overload already flooding organisations.
They confront top executives in an exag-
gerated manner with ever-newer claims
by increasingly peripheral pressure
groups in marginal chat forums or news-
groups. In so doing, such systems do a dis-
service to their true purpose – to provide
orientation and reduce uncertainty. But
what criteria should be used to separate
relevant issues from irrelevant ones?
The crucial importance of diffusion
and reputation potential
Two aspects are fundamental here: the
relevance of an issue is measured both by
its diffusion potential and its reputation
potential. For a specific topic to become
important for an organisation, it must
firstly make an appropriate career for it-
self, i.e. sufficiently enter the public field
of vision and set key communication arenas
resonating. No matter how scathing the
criticism levelled at a company may be, it
nevertheless remains without conse-
quence as long as it is imprisoned in the
ghettos of largely ignored chat forums.
Secondly, the explosiveness of an issue is
measured by its potential to trigger sig-
nificant reputation effects. A topic may
appear prominently on the title pages of
all the mass media, but its explosive po-
tential remains low as long as the criticism
bypasses the company concerned and a
glance at the way developments are mov-
ing also suggests that we cannot expect it
to harm the good reputation of the com-
pany in the future.
An early detection tool of the kind de-
veloped at the University of Zurich’s fög
Institute is based on systematic monitor-
ing of leading national and international
opinion formers in the mass, expert and
specialist media (TV, radio, press and on-
line media). It monitors all issues, from
the film festival in Locarno to the Iraq
war, to the impending revision of the
Swiss corporation stock law, continuous-
ly and without any thematic restrictions.
The monitored topics are continuously
evaluated from this comprehensively up-
dated issues database to determine
whether they have the potential to fur-
ther spread in relevant communication
arenas and to affect the reputation of rele-
vant organisations. Of special import-
ance for this relevance appraisal is the
question of how much social energy is
bound by a particular issue, i.e. how power-
ful the agents are that stand behind the
topic. Experience teaches us that an issue
normally has little impact on reputation if
it is driven forward only by media profes-
sionals or journalists. However, the more
influential agents, who have the power to
define issues, and share a specific critical
view of corporations, stand behind the
issue, the greater is the impact on the
relevant reputation. In terms of measure-
ment technology, an issue is particularly
explosive and calls for action from a cor-
porate standpoint when the criticism (or
praise) is directed in a massed manner by
diverse powerful agents and the topic is
treated in an intensive, sustained and
broadly supportive way by public com-
munication.
However, Issues Monitoring cannot
work miracles: it is merely a tool designed
to create the conditions for organisations
to learn from their experiences sooner
rather than later in some cases. And this
means creating a reliable classification of
potentially explosive issues.
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IR Firm supports listed and financial ser-
vices companies in the conceptualisation
and implementation of their communica-
tions with the capital market participants.
The company has extensive experience in
developing and maintaining investor and
media relations, in handling the commu-
nicative challenges of special situations
(capital market transactions such as pub-
lic offerings, rights issues and mergers &
acquisitions) and in the conceptualisation
and implementation of publications and
IR websites.
The IR Firm advisory team expands
this knowledge continually and creates
added value for those companies which
want to increase their profile in the finan-
cial community and to create a dialogue
with their targeted audiences. In addition to
traditional IR communications measures,
IR Firm offers new instruments in the
analysis of investors’ perceptions and be-
haviour. The range of activities spans from
advising on strategy regarding the concep-
tion and realisation of individual measures
to regular measurements of results.
Building relationships with current
and potential investors is primarily a mat-
ter of interface work. From a corporate
standpoint, market opportunities, compa-
ny strategy, management resources and
company finances have to be brought in-
to proper balance. In the capital market a
constructive dialogue must be pursued
with investors, financial analysts and
financial journalists. IR Firm’s in-depth
experience and knowledge of how these
interfaces function enhance the effective-
ness and efficiency of its clients’ investor
relations activities.
IR Firm’s specialists have experience
in managing the complex interplay be-
tween companies and the financial com-
munity. Its client teams are headed by
company partners and are individually set
up for each specific project so as to best
meet client needs. IR Firm also maintains
a broad network of useful contacts with
opinion leaders in research, education
and practice.
As a member of a strong, internation-
al team, IR Firm’s challenge is to create
added value for clients operating both
within a domestic market and across na-
tional borders. IR Firm is the Swiss part-
ner of:
Financial Dynamics (FD) is one of the
world’s leading providers of financial
communications services with offices in
London, New York and other centres. In
addition to investor relations, FD special-
ises in financial public relations, crisis
communications and capital market
transactions.
You can find further information 
on The Investor Relations Firm AG
on our website www.irfirm.biz. 
We would be delighted to hold a per-
sonal discussion on your needs.
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Special situations trigger volatility
Crisis situations in general spread uncertainty, often resulting in a more confusing
picture of the affected organisation’s prospects. Lack of understanding or disagree-
ment may find expression in unwanted volatility in share prices. 
Bob Haville, Managing Director, and 
Alison Allfrey, Senior Vice President, 
Financial Dynamics, London
ormally, when people talk
about volatility, they are refer-
ring to some destabilising po-
litical act or a change in direction in eco-
nomic conditions. However, at a different
level, most IROs are thinking about their
individual share price volatility and what,
if anything, they can, or even should, do
about it. The following focuses on volatil-
ity itself, namely: the relative rate at
which the price of a security moves up
and down. If the price of a stock moves
up and down rapidly over short time
periods, it has high volatility. If the price
almost never changes, it has low volatility.
Various factors contributed to an increase
in market volatility in the last ten years:
• the explosive growth in the creation and
use of options and derivatives;
• the growth in a newer breed of in-
vestors, such as the hedge funds and ac-
tivists, with different objectives and time
horizons;
• the rapid growth of the private equity
funds as they seek to buy or sell often
very sizeable assets at prices sometimes
outside the “normal” investors’ range,
through the use of leverage.
Indeed, in the case of the hedge funds, it
may well be that volatility is an overall ob-
jective as they seek to deploy more cre-
ative investment techniques in the search
for absolute returns, themselves seeming-
ly on a decreasing curve. 
Whilst it is true that hedge funds (and
also other investors) have to manage their
investments all the time, whether mar-
kets are volatile or not, in really adverse
conditions, liquidity is reduced and this
means that fund managers experience
greater difficulty in unwinding positions
without impacting prices – thus adding to
volatility! This didn’t matter as much
when the hedge fund industry was rela-
tively small. Back even as recently as in
the mid 1990s, hedge funds accounted for
negligible amounts of the total funds under
management. Now, this total has risen to
nearly $1.5 trillion and is still increasing as
institutions continue to both enter the
market and increase their internal alloca-
tion of money to hedge funds in the pur-
suit of portfolio diversification.
In general, brokers quite like volatil-
ity, despite protestations to the contrary,
seeking both to create it and take advant-
age whenever possible, as long as they can
control events and bring liquidity to bear
when appropriate. 
A lot of people in the investor relat-
ions world only really think about price
volatility if their share price is going down
fast and looks like it does not want to stop.
Any management concern over a rapidly
upward moving share price is normally
the result of a being a potential or actual
bid target. Or, perhaps down to that most
welcome of events in the investor rela-
tions world – a leading broker upgrading
both estimates and recommendation. 
Politics and economics matter
The political and economic backdrop de-
fines the landscape of share price forma-
tion and overall valuations. Company
managements spend lots of time and ef-
fort in trying to break out of the straight-
jacket of their respective home market,
sector or historic valuations, continually
pushing for that often elusive premium
rating, only to be blown off course by ex-
ternal events. IPOs are pulled, acquisi-
tions postponed, managements replaced
and retirements brought forward.
The past year or so appears to have
had more than the usual number of
events contributing to market volatility:
the traumas in the Middle East and the
significant rise in oil and energy prices,
coupled with various other disasters of
varying magnitude. In May and June
2006, many equity markets posted some
of their sharpest daily falls since 2003.
Later in July and August, there have been
equally strong high daily gains as markets
recovered and stabilised somewhat.
Over the last two years, there was a
steady rise in global interest rates, not
least in the important US market, with 17
consecutive rises, but also now in Europe
and, quite recently, a reintroduction of
interest rates in Japan. The US Fed always
has to respond to the next set of macro-
economic data and investors have been
reacting to the prospect of continued in-
terest rate hikes, although the latest hold
decision was a significant break with pre-
vious practice.
There is a real fear that the best of the
growth in the global economic cycle has
passed, which may slow down for quite a
while, thus reducing risk appetite. In ad-
dition, the prospect of further monetary
tightening by the Fed, or anyone else,
helps create greater uncertainty and risk
aversion by investors, thus contributing to
volatility. 
All this implies that stock market
volatility is here to stay, at least for a while.
It may not just be volatility to worry about
but investor pessimism. Institutional fund
managers are becoming generally more
pessimistic about the macroeconomic
outlook on the back of rising energy
prices and the lagged effects of rising in-
terest rates as the year progresses. Ac-
cording to a regular opinion survey con-
ducted by a leading US investment bank,
the actual level of pessimism is the worst
ever seen since the survey began several
years ago and has found expression in the
highest level of cash balances since 9/11 –
risk aversion is top of the agenda again. 
The IRO and volatility
So what should an IRO do in volatile
markets? Sometimes it seems that a com-
pany’s share price is the mysterious result
of the creation of actuarially defined sec-
tors, competing views on relative growth
rates, analysts’ models and recommenda-
tions, investor appetite and trading books
which are either long or short but rarely
in perfect harmony! It is a remorseless
process where a change in any one of the
above can provoke what can often look
like a completely disproportionate share
price reaction. 
In Switzerland, there is heavy index
weighting towards the financials, phar-
maceutical and chemicals sectors. Whilst
investors try to read and play the cycle,
particularly in chemicals and financials,
Switzerland also has a lot of attractive and
inherently defensive style stocks for in-
ternational investors to consider or in-
crease their weightings in. 
Whilst many Continental European
companies have some well-developed
protective mechanisms, one by one these
are being diluted, or are breaking down
altogether, in the spirit of a free market
economy. One can expect this slow-burn
trend to continue and this will require the
right type of investor relations response,
often in completely changed circum-
stances. 
If there is selling pressure, it may take
a lot longer to stop than anticipated as
new buyers have to be found. The role of
the sell side here can be useful and should
be exploited to the full. One starting
point is to try and ensure that those hous-
es with the highest trading market share
in the stock are making a positive repre-
sentation of the investment case. This
process can be supported by agreeing to
make sales force presentations only at
those broking houses where the com-
pany is seeking to have influence, and by
creating a platform for senior manage-
ment to impress.
One of the most difficult things to de-
termine, for both companies and in-
vestors alike, is whether the volatility is
driven by a substantive change in the eco-
nomic cycle or not. Is it a temporary cor-
rection or a response to a full-blown and
sustainable change in economic condi-
tions? If it is the latter and if it looks like-
ly to last for some time, then the chal-
lenge is definitely moving into new terri-
tory as far as recent experience in investor
relations is concerned – it necessitates be-
ing even more proactive.
PRACTICAL MEASURES IN ORDER 
TO STEM VOLATILITY:
• Keeping a close eye on the evolution of
the share register to pick up on any
change in the investor profile. 
• Indeed, volatile markets may produce a
whole new set of investors with different
requirements, some of whom may not be
all that welcome to management. Ac-
tivist shareholders are at their most ven-
omous in conditions of volatility, par-
ticularly if the cost of their investment is
above that of the prevailing share price.
Many activists only have one goal in
mind: a takeover – so that they can close
their positions. No other outcome is ac-
ceptable to them. 
• Updating the respective investment
cases, even sometimes the whole equity
story itself in order to sharpen the picture.
• Well-established investor relations tech-
niques in targeting, presentations, mes-
saging and feedback will either have to
be introduced or upgraded in the perpet-
ual quest for supportive, long-term in-
vestors, often found outside the domestic
market.
• Conduct a fresh investor-targeting
analysis exercise, designed to identify
new targets with differing investment
goals, 
• e.g. a value play or perhaps GARP as
opposed to outright growth. There is a
need to create a prioritised targeting
strategy with the aim of encouraging
long- term supportive holders and seek a
balance in size amongst holdings to help
offset selling risk.
N
